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INTRODUCTION
In Dostoevsky’s The Idiot, Ippolit Terentyev, a terminally ill
young man, muses on his illness and impending death: “I will die
looking straight into the wellspring of force and life, and I will not
want this life! If it had been in my power not to be born, I probably
would not have accepted existence on such derisive conditions.”1 Can
existence ever be such that nonexistence is preferable? If so, can the
mere fact of a person’s existence become a legally compensable
injury? Wrongful life claims, a specific variety of medical malprac-
tice claim, require courts to grapple with this exact question. In a
wrongful life suit, a disabled child plaintiff—through her parents—
sues a physician or genetic counselor who failed to diagnose the
likelihood of disability such that the mother could have chosen to
terminate the pregnancy. In American jurisprudence, courts have
largely refused to recognize wrongful life; only four states allow
recovery, and to a limited degree only based on a desire to address
the plaintiff’s medical needs.2 The courts in the majority reason that
allowing a child to sue alleging that she should never have been
born would require courts to classify a person’s very life as an injury
and compute damages by comparing the values of a disabled exis-
tence and complete nonexistence.3 The majority views these issues
as highly personal, philosophical inquiries into the meaning of life,
which lie beyond the realm of judicial competence; accordingly, the
majority has avoided recognizing the cause of action.4 
Regardless of the near-uniform consensus against recognizing
wrongful life, the issue continues to cause controversy. On May 6,
2015, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania heard a case challenging
the state’s statutory ban on the cause of action.5 Within the past two
1. FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, THE IDIOT 414 (Richard Pevear & Larissa Volokhonsky trans.,
Vintage Classics 2003) (1869).
2. For a useful summary of the decisional law by jurisdiction, see Gregory G. Sarno,
Annotation, Tort Liability for Wrongfully Causing One to Be Born, 83 A.L.R.3d 15 (1978)
(under “Tables, Laws, and Rules”).
3. See infra notes 14-15 and accompanying text. 
4. See infra notes 19-20 and accompanying text. 
5. See Chris Potter, State Supreme Court Hears ‘Wrongful Life’ Case, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE (May 17, 2015, 12:00 AM), http://www.post-gazette.com/news/state/2015/05/17/
Pennsylvania-State-Supreme-Court-hears-wrongful-life-case/stories/201505170127 [https://
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years, various foreign courts have had to determine for the first time
whether to recognize wrongful life as a cause of action.6 Additional-
ly, a recent trend in scholarship has emerged, arguing for broader
recognition and availability of recovery for wrongful life claims,
either by ignoring the uncomfortable issues courts have grappled
with or by attempting to resolve them in favor of allowing recovery. 
This Note examines this scholarly trend, hoping to clarify the
issues surrounding wrongful life with which courts, at home and
abroad, continue to struggle. This Note concludes that none of the
proffered justifications for wrongful life provides a completely coher-
ent account of the claims under existing legal frameworks. It then
considers more far-reaching problems with recognizing wrongful life
and concludes that wrongful life claims require impermissible ju-
dicial valuations of life and a conception of individual rights that, at
the same time, depends upon and is foreclosed by Roe v. Wade.7
Because the difficulty of wrongful life ultimately stems from the
questions it raises about the meaning and value of human life, no
satisfactory solution can ignore these philosophical questions. This
Note therefore offers a philosophical explanation of, and tentative
solution to, the wrongful life problem, which informs a practical
perma.cc/8JCT-L7T4]. Although the plaintiffs have challenged the law for technical reasons,
alleging that it violates the Pennsylvania Constitution’s “single subject” requirement for
legislation, the suit has reopened the debate about wrongful life more generally. See id.
6. For example, the South African Constitutional Court recently had to consider whether
South African law permits the cause of action. See Sapa, ConCourt to Hear Downs [sic] Syn-
drome Case, CITIZEN (S. Afr.) (Aug. 27, 2014, 6:55 PM), http://citizen.co.za/234908/concourt-
hear-downssyndrome-case/ [https://perma.cc/HRU5–28BY]. An unidentified mother brought
a claim on behalf of her minor child who was born with Down Syndrome, alleging that a
genetic testing center negligently failed to diagnose her child’s condition, thus denying her the
opportunity to terminate the pregnancy. See id. On appeal, she urged an extension of the
common law to recognize a claim for “wrongful life,” particularly in light of the focus on
children’s rights in the South African Constitution and Children’s Act. See id. The mother sub-
sequently changed the basis of her suit from “wrongful life” to “wrongful suffering.” See Aarti
J. Narsee, Mother Sues for Son’s Suffering, TIMES (S. Afr.) (Aug. 29, 2014), http://www.times
live.co.za/thetimes/2014/08/29/mother-sues-for-son-s-suffering [https://perma.cc/NA34-8JNQ].
Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights rejected a wrongful life claim brought on
behalf of a Romanian child born without tibia. Press Release, European Ctr. for Law & Jus-
tice, Human Rights and Eugenics: The More Precautious Approach of the ECHR (June 27,
2014), http://eclj.org/Releases/Read.aspx?GUID=99f0fd59-b54e-45b7-a970-f3c908188032
[https://perma.cc/L7NT-D6FL]. The Court concluded that the claim was not cognizable under
Romanian law or the European Convention on Human Rights, but explicitly abstained from
deciding whether a handicapped child has a compensable right not to be born. See id.
7. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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proposal that seeks a nonjudicial means of helping children who
suffer the sort of birth defects that give rise to wrongful life suits. 
Part I will trace the development of the cause of action and out-
line the majority and minority rules within United States jurisdic-
tions. Part II examines defenses of wrongful life based on traditional
negligence, contract, and strict liability frameworks, and finds each
inadequate for measuring damages and avoiding problems outlined
by courts. Part III considers rights-based justifications of wrongful
life and concludes that allowing the cause of action will require im-
permissible judicial valuations of individuals, and that rights-based
arguments require a conception of personhood that contradicts Roe
v. Wade. Lastly, the conclusion presents a tentative solution, based
on birth injury compensation programs in Florida and Virginia, that
removes wrongful life plaintiffs from the courts entirely while still
addressing their medical needs. 
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CAUSE OF ACTION
The first use of the term “wrongful life” occurred in Zepeda v.
Zepeda, in which an Illinois appellate court refused to create a new
cause of action allowing an illegitimate child to sue his father for
damages resulting from his status as a bastard.8 Several years later,
the seminal New Jersey case Gleitman v. Cosgrove extended the
wrongful life concept to its now familiar disability context.9 In Gleit-
man, the plaintiff’s mother had contracted German measles during
her pregnancy, which caused the plaintiff to be born with severe
hearing, speech, and sight defects.10 The plaintiff’s parents brought
suit on his behalf, alleging that the mother’s treating physician, who
knew of her German measles, had negligently failed to disclose the
likelihood of birth defects such that the mother could have had an
8. See 190 N.E.2d 849, 858 (Ill. App. Ct. 1963). The court predicted that granting a
wrongful life cause of action could have far-reaching ramifications that required deference to
the legislature. See id. at 859; see also Williams v. State, 223 N.E.2d 343, 343-44 (N.Y. 1966)
(denying recovery to an infant plaintiff asserting a negligence claim against the state for fail-
ure to prevent a sexual assault on his mother in a state-run mental institution that led to the
plaintiff’s birth out of wedlock).
9. See 227 A.2d 689 (N.J. 1967).
10. Id. at 690. 
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abortion.11 The court noted at the outset of its analysis that the de-
fendant physician did not cause the defect: nothing he could have
done would have brought about a perfectly healthy child.12 Thus, to
prove proximate causation as required in tort, the plaintiff would
have to classify his existence itself as the injury: “In other words, he
claims that the conduct of defendants prevented his mother from
obtaining an abortion which would have terminated his existence,
and that his very life is ‘wrongful.’”13 
The Gleitman court ultimately refused to recognize the plaintiff’s
claim based on his inability to establish an injury that the court
could compensate.14 The court based its denial on its inability to
evaluate the relative values of disabled existence and “the utter void
of nonexistence,” a necessary inquiry to establish damages.15 “By as-
serting that he should not have been born, the infant plaintiff
makes it logically impossible for a court to measure his alleged dam-
ages because of the impossibility of making the comparison required
by compensatory remedies.”16 
Although New Jersey itself has now overruled Gleitman in favor
of allowing limited recovery,17 the current majority rule follows
Gleitman and holds that damages are unavailable to a disabled
plaintiff.18 States have variously made the cause of action unavail-
11. Id. at 690-91. 





17. See Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 14-15 (N.J. 1979).
18. In denying the cause of action, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts noted
that denying recovery is “[t]he almost universal rule in this country.” Viccaro v. Milunsky, 551
N.E.2d 8, 12 (Mass. 1990).
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able by judicial decision19 or by statute.20 Courts perceive the same
general difficulty with a tort theory of wrongful life as the Gleitman
court did: because the physician did not cause the disability, estab-
lishing causation requires the harm to be existence, not the
disability, and courts are not equipped to measure existence versus
nonexistence.21 The position the New York Court of Appeals adopted
in denying the cause of action nicely summarizes the dominant atti-
tude: “Whether it is better never to have been born at all than to
have been born with even gross deficiencies is a mystery more prop-
erly to be left to the philosophers and the theologians” than the
judicial system, “particularly in view of the very nearly uniform
high value which the law and mankind has placed on human life,
rather than its absence.”22 
A minority of states, however, permit a wrongful life plaintiff
limited recovery. Seeking to avoid judicial valuations of childrens’
lives, the minority states limit recovery to the child’s medical expen-
ses, pain, and suffering. The first state to do so, and to reject the
reasoning of the majority of the states, was California in the 1980
19. See, e.g., Pizano ex rel. Walker v. Mart, 790 P.2d 735, 741 (Ariz. 1990) (“Bringing a
child into the world—even one who is impaired—is not a legally cognizable injury to that
child. Thus, children suffer no legal injury when a parent, doctor, or other practitioner fails
to prevent their birth.”); Lininger ex rel. Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202, 1212 (Colo.
1988) (dismissing a wrongful life claim because plaintiff’s life “cannot rationally be said to be
a detriment to him when measured against the alternative of his not having existed at all”);
Garrison v. Med. Ctr. of Del. Inc., 581 A.2d 288, 294 (Del. 1989) (“We concur with the view
that the question of whether it would have been better for an impaired child to never have
lived at all is a philosophical one not amenable to judicial resolution.”).
20. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-334(1) (West 2015) (“A cause of action shall not arise,
and damages shall not be awarded, on behalf of any person, based on the claim that but for
the act or omission of another, a person would not have been permitted to have been born
alive but would have been aborted.”); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2971(2) (West 2015) (“A
person shall not bring a civil action for damages on a wrongful life claim.”); N.D. CENT. CODE
ANN. § 32-03-43 (West 2015) (“No person may maintain a claim for relief or receive an award
for damages on that person’s own behalf based on the claim that, but for the act or omission
of another, that person would have been aborted.”). West Virginia courts echo Zepeda’s
hesitancy to approach such a delicate issue ahead of the legislature and have held that
wrongful life claims are inactionable in the state absent a statute authorizing them. See, e.g.,
James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872, 881 (W. Va. 1985).
21. See, e.g., Kassama v. Magat, 792 A.2d 1102, 1118, 1123-24 (Md. 2002) (refusing to
recognize a wrongful life cause of action and holding that “[Gleitman’s] core problem, with its
several offshoots, has plagued all of the courts that have had to deal with the issue”).
22. Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812 (N.Y. 1978). The court described the possible
ramifications of allowing the cause of action as “staggering.” See id. 
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case Curlender ex rel. Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories.23
Dealing with an issue of first impression in California, the court
evaluated the claim of a child plaintiff born with Tay-Sachs disease
against the genetic testing facility and physician her mother had
consulted to determine the parents’ status as carriers of the disease
prior to conceiving a child.24 The plaintiff’s complaint alleged that
the defendants’ negligence had caused her parents to receive incor-
rect information, resulting in her birth and a shortened, disabled
life.25 The court acknowledged the difficulties previous courts had
recognized as reasons for denying the cause of action, but concluded
that “[i]t is neither necessary nor just to retreat into meditation on
the mysteries of life,” as previous courts had done.26 The court
avoided the issue of measuring disabled existence versus nonexis-
tence and refused to interpret wrongful life as asserting a right not
to be born.27 Instead, the court granted damages for only “the pain
and suffering to be endured during the limited life span available to
such a child and any special pecuniary loss resulting from the
impaired condition.”28 
In a subsequent case, Turpin v. Sortini, the California Supreme
Court sitting en banc reaffirmed the availability of a cause of action
for wrongful life but modified the Curlender holding.29 Turpin criti-
cized Curlender for glossing over the difficulty in establishing injury
by focusing only on the plaintiff’s condition after birth.30 The court
23. 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), abrogated by Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954
(Cal. 1982).
24. See id. at 480. 
25. Id.
26. See id. at 488. The court reasoned that “[t]he reality of the ‘wrongful-life’ concept is
that such a plaintiff both exists and suffers, due to the negligence of others.... We need not be
concerned with the fact that had defendants not been negligent, the plaintiff might not have
come into existence at all.” Id.
27. See id. at 489.
28. Id. In one sense, the California rule awards expansive recovery, as it calculates
damages for the entire duration of the child’s life. It awards conceptually limited relief,
however, in that it restricts the set of compensable harms to the child’s pain, suffering, and
medical expenses, as opposed to compensating the child’s very existence. Cf. supra notes 19-20
and accompanying text. 
29. See 643 P.2d 954 (Cal. 1982).
30. Turpin held that Curlender “ignores the essential nature of the defendants’ alleged
wrong.... [T]he obvious tragic fact is that plaintiff never had a chance ‘to be born as a whole,
functional human being without total deafness’; if defendants had performed their jobs
properly, she ... would not have been born at all.” Id. at 961.
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held that a plaintiff may not recover general damages for being born
disabled rather than not being born at all.31 Instead, he may recover
special damages equal to the “extraordinary expenses” required for
treatment.32 The court found traditional rationales persuasive
enough to reject general damages,33 but held that the financial bur-
den on the plaintiff’s family and the ability to measure special dam-
ages without difficulty justified recovery.34
The remaining jurisdictions that recognize wrongful life causes of
action—Maine, New Jersey, and Washington—have adopted largely
similar rules as California, permitting recovery of specific damages
based upon the extraordinary medical expenses accompanying the
plaintiff’s disabled state.35 However, these states do not allow recov-
ery of general damages based upon defining the plaintiff’s very life
as an injury, an inquiry which they recognize exceeds judicial capa-
city.36 In the words of Procanik, “We need not become preoccupied
... with these metaphysical considerations.”37 Many subsequent
courts in jurisdictions that do not recognize wrongful life have found
the distinctions these jurisdictions draw less than persuasive.38
31. Id. at 966.
32. Id.
33. See id. at 963.
34. See id. at 965-66. 
35. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2931(3) (2015) (“Damages for the birth of an
unhealthy child born as the result of professional negligence shall be limited to damages asso-
ciated with the disease, defect or handicap suffered by the child.”); Procanik ex rel. Procanik
v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 763 (N.J. 1984) (“Our decision to allow the recovery of extraordinary
medical expenses is not premised on the concept that non-life is preferable to an impaired life,
but is predicated on the needs of the living.”); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483,
496 (Wash. 1983) (“[O]ne of the consequences of the birth of the child who claims wrongful life
is the incurring of extraordinary expenses for medical care and special training. These
expenses are calculable.”). 
36. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2931(3) (“Damages … shall be limited to dama-
ges associated with disease, defect or handicap.”) (emphasis added); Procanik, 478 A.2d at 760
(“[P]olicy considerations have led this Court in the past to decline to recognize any cause of
action in an infant for his wrongful life. The threshold problem had been the assertion by
infant plaintiffs not that they should have been born without defects, but that they should not
have been born at all.”); Harbeson, 656 P.2d at 492 (“The real question as to injury, therefore,
is not the existence of the injury, but the extent of that injury. In other words, having
recognized that the birth of the child represents an injury, how do we measure damages?”).
37. Procanik, 478 A.2d at 763.
38. See, e.g., Lininger ex rel. Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202, 1212 (Colo. 1988) (“We
... conclude that the Washington Supreme Court, as did the Supreme Courts of California and
New Jersey, chose to disregard the child’s failure to prove an injury in light of its perception
that the equities of permitting the child to recover special damages were entitled to greater
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II. INADEQUACY OF RECENT ATTEMPTS TO JUSTIFY RECOGNIZING
WRONGFUL LIFE
Notwithstanding the persistent conceptual difficulties inherent
in wrongful life that courts denying or allowing recovery recognize,
recent literature shows a growing trend in favor of allowing the
cause of action, or broadening recovery in jurisdictions that already
allow it in a limited way. This Part examines these various at-
tempts, focusing on putative justifications of wrongful life based on
principles of negligence, contract, and strict liability. It concludes
that wrongful life does not fit coherently into any of these concep-
tual frameworks because they all fail to adequately describe the
legally compensable injury without defining the injury as the
plaintiff’s very existence. 
A. The Traditional Negligence Framework
As discussed above, courts have typically interpreted wrongful life
claims as sounding in negligence, effectively a highly specialized
medical malpractice claim.39 The difficulty of describing wrongful
life as a negligence claim, particularly with respect to the elements
of causation and damages, accounts for the hesitancy to grant recov-
ery and the limited nature of any recovery that occurs.40
It is important at the outset to distinguish wrongful life from
several other torts involving conception. Wrongful life is distin-
guished from a standard prenatal tort claim41 in that the physician
does not cause an otherwise healthy child to be born with an injury.
Rather, in wrongful life, the child had no chance of being born with-
out the defect, and the physician simply deprived the mother of the
weight.”); Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341, 354 (N.H. 1986) (“The essence of the Turpin rule is
that logic should not defeat the claim of a severely impaired child in need of help.”). 
39. See supra Part I. 
40. See supra notes 12, 27. 
41. See Roland F. Chase, Liability for Prenatal Injuries, 40 A.L.R.3d 1222, § 2[b] (1971)
(“The law is now clear in virtually all American jurisdictions that have ruled on the
question—a tort action can be maintained to recover damages for prenatal injuries negligently
inflicted, if the injured child is born alive.”).
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opportunity to abort.42 Additionally, wrongful life differs from
wrongful birth in that the child brings the claim in the former
whereas in the latter, the parents bring the claim on their own be-
half.43 In a wrongful birth suit, the parents seek compensation for
their lost ability to exercise their right to abort the child, but in
wrongful life their child seeks compensation for his own injuries,
allegedly caused by the parents’ failure to abort. Some states recog-
nize wrongful birth but not wrongful life as a cause of action.44
In arguing for broader imposition of wrongful life liability, Deana
Pollard contends that the rejection of wrongful life stems from
courts’ improper emphasis on the compensatory function of tort law
and the inability to return the plaintiff to a pre-tort state.45 She as-
serts that courts focus on this compensatory function46 to the exclu-
sion of other fundamental goals of tort law, such as allocating loss
42. See Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 961 (Cal. 1982) (“In an ordinary prenatal injury
case, if the defendant had not been negligent, the child would have been born healthy.... In
this case, by contrast, the obvious tragic fact is that plaintiff never had a chance ‘to be born
as a whole, functional human being without total deafness.’”).
43. Compare, e.g., Geler v. Akawie, 818 A.2d 402, 411 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (“In
wrongful birth cases, there is no claim that the negligence of the physician caused the child’s
impairments. The sole claim is that negligence precluded the parents’ opportunity to decide
whether to give birth to the impaired child in the first place.”), with Ginsberg ex rel. Ginsberg
v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., 117 A.3d 200, 224-25 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015) (“Apart from
wrongful birth claims by parents, New Jersey separately recognizes what are known in this
state as ‘wrongful life’ claims, which may be brought on behalf of infants born with congenital
defects.”) (footnote omitted).
44. See, e.g., Pizano ex rel. Walker v. Mart, 790 P.2d 735, 741 (Ariz. 1990); Garrison v.
Med. Ctr. of Del. Inc., 581 A.2d 288, 289 (Del. 1989). Other torts can arise in contexts where
the parents did not desire a pregnancy at all. For example, “wrongful conception” stems from
“failed birth control, negligent provision of birth control or a negligently performed steriliza-
tion; “wrongful pregnancy” assumes the negligent act occurred after pregnancy and may
result from a negligent failure to timely identify a pregnancy or a negligently performed abor-
tion. See Ralph R. Frasca, Negligent Beginnings: Damages in Wrongful Conception, Wrongful
Birth and Wrongful Life, 19 J. FORENSIC ECON. 185, 186 (2006). These torts, like wrongful
birth, differ from wrongful life in that the parents, not the child, allege legal harm. See id. at
185.
45. See Deana A. Pollard, Wrongful Analysis in Wrongful Life Jurisprudence, 55 ALA. L.
REV. 327, 331-32 (2004). Pollard attributes this persistent emphasis to the influence of the
Gleitman analysis. Id. 
46. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1979) (“While the law of contracts gives
to a party to a contract as damages for its breach an amount equal to the benefit he would
have received had the contract been performed, the law of torts attempts primarily to put an
injured person in a position as nearly as possible equivalent to his position prior to the tort.”)
(internal citation omitted).
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to those who cause harm, cost-spreading, and punishing and
deterring wrongful conduct.47 Pollard contends that tort law is mov-
ing toward these broader goals and “away from denying recovery
based on a technical application of elements required to state a
cause of action at common law,” thus doing away with the tradition-
al reasons for refusing to recognize wrongful life.48 
Pollard nonetheless attempts to justify wrongful life within the
elements of a standard negligence claim. She contends that a plain-
tiff can easily establish the physician as the cause of the injury.49
The mother’s testimony that she would have had an abortion absent
the physician’s mistake proves but-for causation.50 Because the ele-
ment of proximate causation limits a defendant’s liability to fore-
seeable harms sustained by foreseeable plaintiffs, and because the
manifestation of a birth defect upon the birth of a child that the
physician examined in utero is a foreseeable harm (given a failure
to diagnose a defect), the plaintiff can establish proximate causa-
tion.51 
Pollard’s causation analysis, however, glosses over several serious
issues. First, in any given wrongful life case, it is not necessarily
clear that the child would not have existed but for the physician’s
negligence. In conceivable scenarios, a physician could comply com-
pletely with the standard of care and diagnose a birth defect, but the
parents could choose not to abort. The child would then exist absent
any negligence. This presents an evidentiary problem: proving caus-
ation in fact requires the testimony of the mother, a highly inter-
ested party, as to a highly subjective, counterfactual course of
action. 
Second, and more importantly, Pollard ignores a central premise
of wrongful life: namely, that nothing the physician did could have
47. See Pollard, supra note 45, at 336. 
48. Id. at 341-42; see also Francis Sohn, Note, Products Liability and the Fertility
Industry: Overcoming Some Problems in “Wrongful Life”, 44 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 145, 162-63
(2011). Sohn argues that limiting recovery because of the difficulty of returning a plaintiff to
her pre-tort condition is an “extremely narrow view of the function of damages in tort.” Id.
Instead, courts should “do substantial justice to the victims of wrongful life” and measure
damages according to the pain and suffering that the negligent genetic counselor caused. Id.
at 163.
49. See Pollard, supra note 45, at 344.
50. See id.
51. See id. 
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treated or prevented the pre-existing genetic defect.52 If the physi-
cian could not have cured the defect, then in a real sense, he is not
the but-for cause of the defect; the plaintiff’s genetic makeup is. Put
differently, the physician caused the child’s existence, while the
child’s genetic predisposition caused the impaired state. Of course,
this objection to Pollard collapses if courts describe the injury as the
child’s birth instead of the genetic defect. However, doing so reintro-
duces the difficulties courts have encountered in treating a child’s
very life as an injury, the same issues Pollard attempts to eliminate. 
The Restatement (Third) of Torts provides that “[w]hen damages
for an injury can be divided by causation, the factfinder first divides
them into their indivisible component parts and separately appor-
tions liability for each indivisible component.”53 A factfinder can
apportion damages according to causation when there exists reason-
able evidence to determine (1) that a negligent party’s conduct “was
a legal cause of less than the entire damages,” and (2) “the amount
of damages separately caused by that conduct.”54
The courts that currently award special damages for wrongful life
attempt to apportion damages in this way: they conclude that the
physician was the legal cause of less than the entire damages (the
suffering caused by the birth defect, not the plaintiff’s entire exis-
tence), and that the damages are calculable.55 However, in doing so,
they adopt a mix-and-match approach to apportionment and hold
the physician liable for the harm that genetics caused.56 Classifying
the injury as indivisible might fit more neatly within existing tort
doctrine, but would force courts to consider the plaintiff’s entire life,
both defect and existence, as the harm—the result they have at-
tempted to avoid.
Pollard also fails to provide a description of damages that comport
with existing tort doctrine. She contends that in light of the expand-
52. This is contrasted with a prebirth tort claim, where the physician does cause the
injury. See generally supra notes 41-44.
53. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 26(a) (2000).
54. Id. § 26(b) (emphasis added). 
55. See, e.g., Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 496 (Wash. 1983) (“General
damages are certainly beyond computation.... But one of the consequences of the birth of the
child who claims wrongful life is the incurring of extraordinary expenses for medical care and
special training. These expenses are calculable.”). 
56. See, e.g., id. at 496-97.
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ed goals of contemporary tort law, a plaintiff should not have to
prove damages beyond the medical and other extraordinary ex-
penses the minority jurisdictions already award.57 Even if courts
require something more than medical expenses, a wrongful life
plaintiff has compensable injuries in pain and suffering, lost chance
for medical intervention, and interference with a due process liberty
interest.58 None of these purported harms provide a satisfactory
measure of damages. As discussed above, measuring damages by
expenses alone separates the cause and harm. Pain and suffering
would be bound up too closely with the subjective value placed on
life. Lost chance for medical intervention presupposes that the
physician could have improved the child’s chance of a healthy life
with a proper diagnosis, but this is not a standard wrongful life
claim and could be easily redressed with a standard prenatal tort
claim. 
Lastly, Pollard attempts to circumvent the problem of defining
the compensable injury by casting the injury as a violation of a
right.59 Other supporters of wrongful life have gone so far as to hold
that the parents, not just their physician, commit a moral harm, or
violate a right, by knowingly bringing into existence a disabled
child.60 Part III will discuss the fatal issues that arise through
parsing the injury as a rights violation. 
In sum, traditional negligence doctrine seems ill-suited to handle
the peculiarities of wrongful life. A court must either separate the
harm from its cause or consider the plaintiff’s very existence as an
injury, both of which are undesirable. 
57. See Pollard, supra note 45, at 352. 
58. See id. 
59. Pollard argues that in some cases “the fetus’s best interests are served and her right
to avoid suffering is most effectively advanced by terminating her life prior to birth.... [T]he
child’s right to avoid suffering should be recognized, and infringement of that right should
constitute injury.” Id. at 360-61 (footnote omitted).
60. See, e.g., David Archard, Wrongful Life, 79 PHIL. 403, 420 (2004) (arguing that parents
do wrong in “knowingly bringing into existence a child” deprived of “a good number of those
rights that are listed in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child”). For a re-
cent iteration of this argument in the public sphere, and the response from disability rights
groups, see, for example, Richard Dawkins Apologises for Causing Storm with Down’s Syn-
drome Tweet, GUARDIAN (Aug. 21, 2014, 12:13 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/science/2014/
aug/21/richard-dawkins-apologises-downs-syndrome-tweet [https://perma.cc/HZ4L-M9F2].
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B. Contract-based Justifications
Professor Ronen Perry contends that the conceptual incongruence
between wrongful life and tort law, not any convincing policy con-
siderations, explains the widespread refusal to recognize wrongful
life.61 He offers a contract-based conceptual framework for wrongful
life claims, arguing that “since the Gordian knot of tort law cannot
be untied, it must be cut altogether.”62 Perry’s view is that a wrong-
ful life claim becomes a claim for breach of a warranty by the physi-
cian, that the parents would give birth to a healthy child, with the
child plaintiff able to recover as a third-party beneficiary of the
implied contract.63 Perry supports expectancy damages that place
the plaintiff as close as possible to the position the physician war-
ranted, namely, a life free of defect.64 
Perry contends that a contract framework dispenses with many
of the problems inherent in a tort-based wrongful life claim.65
Awarding damages necessary to place the plaintiff in the position
the defendant warranted avoids forcing courts to make impossible
comparisons between existence and nonexistence, and does not risk
judicial value judgments that might offend the disabled.66 Addition-
ally, Perry alleges, measuring damages in this way does not require
parents to testify to what they would have done if they had different
information and does not force courts to discriminate between those
disabilities that are worth compensating and those that are not: any
child in a condition different from that which the defendant war-
ranted can recover.67 No court has embraced this approach to date. 
Perry’s formulation probably has the greatest intuitive force of all
the justifications for wrongful life, but regardless, a contract-based
approach has conceptual issues that prevent it from making wrong-
61. See Ronen Perry, It’s a Wonderful Life, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 329, 381 (2008). Perry
agrees with the majority’s reasoning that the harm in a tort-based wrongful life suit is logic-
ally self-defeating, and courts are not equipped to make the impossible comparison between
disabled life and nonexistence. See id. at 361-62.
62. Id. at 398.
63. See id. 
64. See id. at 396. 
65. See id.
66. See id. For a discussion of the effects of wrongful life on the societal view of the
disabled, see infra Part III.A. 
67. See Perry, supra note 61, at 396.
2016] RIGHTS GONE WRONG 2343
ful life completely coherent. Perry distinguishes between two types
of wrongful life cases: one in which the plaintiff’s parents received
faulty genetic counseling and relied upon it in choosing to conceive,
and one in which the parents had conceived before counseling and
relied upon the incorrect information in choosing to bring the preg-
nancy to term.68 Perry admits that his framework cannot apply to
the first case, because the defendant did not promise that the child
would be healthy, but rather that no child would be conceived at
all.69 Placing the plaintiff in the position warranted would thus
require compensating the plaintiff’s entire existence, the same
problem that led to the rejection of tort-based claims. 
The problem is that this same conclusion also follows in the se-
cond variety of wrongful life claims that Perry identifies. Perry ar-
gues that it does not, because in such cases the defendant promises
the parents that they will give birth to a healthy child.70 Accord-
ingly, the measure of damages would place the child in the situation
warranted—namely, a healthy existence.71 
However, Perry’s analysis errs in construing the warranty as a
promise that the parents will have a healthy child. Parents do not
pay genetic counselors to tell them they will bear a healthy child,
however much they hope that is what they will hear. Rather,
parents pay for correct results of genetic tests, for good or ill, upon
which they can base decisions. Thus, the genetic counselor does not
necessarily warrant that the parents will have a healthy child, but
rather that he provided an accurate prognosis about the child’s
likelihood of disability. In fact, no physician can categorically prom-
ise that a child will be healthy. Thus, Perry’s theory depends upon
an implied warranty of an outcome that no physician has the power
to warrant. 
Making a contract theory practicable would require construing
the physician’s implied warranty as a promise that the parents
would receive correct information about their child’s likelihood of
disability. Expectancy damages upon breach would then seek to put
the plaintiff in the warranted position: having an accurate progno-
68. See id. at 396-97. 
69. See id. 
70. See id.
71. See id. at 394-95. 
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sis. But this would bring the analysis right back to the conclusion
that cripples a tort-based analysis: the plaintiff’s parents would
have to testify that had they received the correct information as
warranted, they would have chosen abortion. The child’s very
existence once again becomes the injury requiring compensation. 
Additionally, Perry’s suggested framework imposes an even
higher burden on physicians than tort law. He acknowledges that
the state of scientific and technological progress, inherent uncer-
tainty in some medical tests, and human analysis can limit the
accuracy of genetic tests in ways beyond the physician’s control.72
Perry argues that a disclaimer of these limits to the parents quali-
fies the warranty and absolves the defendant of any defects result-
ing from these errors, whereas a physician who fails to make this
disclaimer “implicitly assures the parents of the accuracy of the
representation,” even when errors result from unavoidable limits in
science.73 Under tort law, a physician need only comply with the
standard of a reasonable practitioner, subject to the inherent limits
in medicine.74 Under Perry’s framework, a physician must not only
comply with the reasonable standard of care, but must disclose its
limitations to the prospective parents. Implying a warranty that
requires disclaimer of any error resulting from forces beyond the
physician’s control would create a large extension of the duties of
physicians who practice in the genetic counseling field. 
C. Strict Liability Justifications
Like Perry, Alan Belsky accepts that a negligence-based scheme
for wrongful life requires a comparison between disabled existence
and nonexistence, a “[m]etaphysical [c]onundrum” that courts are
ill-equipped to solve.75 Accordingly, Belsky advocates an alternative
approach using tort principles of strict products liability as a
model.76
72. See id. at 388. 
73. See id. 
74. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A cmts. b, e (1965).
75. Alan J. Belsky, Injury as a Matter of Law: Is This the Answer to the Wrongful Life
Dilemma?, 22 U. BALT. L. REV. 185, 222 (1993).
76. See id. at 248.
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Belsky defines strict liability as “liability without fault,” or “liabil-
ity imposed merely because an act was committed without regard to
the level of care exercised by the defendant in seeking to avoid the
risk of harm to others.”77 Under this framework, a genetic counselor
in a wrongful life case breaches a duty of care and provides a
defective product (erroneous counseling) to the plaintiff’s parents,
which causes harm to the plaintiff.78
Belsky asserts that this approach has several advantages. First,
it completely circumvents the difficult issues involved in proving
negligence and provides an economic incentive to the genetic coun-
selor by assigning costs to him, as the counselor is the one best able
to avoid harms and the one who derives economic benefit from the
counseling.79 Second, a strict liability framework does not require
the plaintiff to assert his existence as a compensable injury, thus
“reliev[ing] the courts of the unnecessary metaphysical consider-
ations they contend prevent any monetary award for wrongful
life.”80 Belsky contends that “[r]elieving wrongful life plaintiffs of
their burden of proving injury to a philosophical certainty will en-
courage early settlement of legitimate claims since the defendant no
longer will have the issue of injury on which to hang her hat.”81
Belsky’s argument leaves questions: the whole point behind
courts’ finding claims “illegitimate” has been plaintiffs’ inability to
establish injury, but Belsky advocates the strict liability framework
to allow recovery on otherwise “legitimate” claims. He offers no ex-
planation for why those claims are legitimate, other than the fact
that the counselor deviated from a given standard of care and
requires an incentive to avoid such behavior in the future.82
However, Belsky offers no convincing reason why the incentive
should come in the form of paying damages to the disabled child—
who has not established an injury—as opposed to other incentives,
77. Id. at 249. 
78. See id. at 251-52.
79. See id. at 254-58.
80. Id. at 248. 
81. Id. at 263.
82. Indeed, his rationales are nearly purely economic: liability is justified because the
genetic counselor requires an economic incentive to act prudently and is the best accident
avoider, the best risk allocator, and a participant in a market with a duty to consumers. See
id. at 254-58. 
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such as fines or professional discipline. And in limiting his ratio-
nales to economics, Belsky ignores broader-reaching, noneconomic
harms inherent in wrongful life.83
Nor does a strict liability approach solve the problems inherent
in the traditional negligence-based wrongful life claim. Belsky
recognizes that his framework does not deal with the issue of dam-
ages, but nevertheless argues in favor of awarding nonpecuniary
pain and suffering damages because they are calculable.84 Strange-
ly, though, strict products liability causes of action, which Belsky
uses as his analogy, require a showing of resultant damages.85 The
Restatement (Third) of Torts recalls that strict liability for defective
products arose in the 1960s because of conceptual difficulties in
describing such cases according to traditional negligence principles;
courts perceived policy rationales for compensating plaintiff’s
injuries, so they began finding liability even when plaintiffs could
not prove fault.86
Belsky argues for a similar expansion of doctrine for policy rea-
sons, but he stands the strict liability rationale on its head. Instead
of dispensing with the element of fault in favor of harm, Belsky dis-
penses with harm in favor of fault. Perhaps strict liability allows a
claim against a genuinely negligent defendant and avoids the issue
of proving causation that has plagued the negligence framework,
but it gets no closer to providing a compelling account of injury. 
83. See infra Part III. 
84. See Belsky, supra note 75, at 266. Francis Sohn advocates a similar products liability-
based approach to wrongful life in the context of fertility clinics, based on the idea that
donated sperm is a “defective product” when it causes genetic disabilities to the resulting
child, and that the fertility clinic is liable as the supplier of this product. See Sohn, supra note
48, at 173-74. Although quite clever, his solution would have limited use outside the context
of fertility clinics or assisted reproduction. Furthermore, it suffers from the same inadequacies
as Belsky’s theory in that it does not measure damages in a way that avoids the standard
conceptual issues courts have encountered. 
85. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 (1998) (“One engaged in the
business of selling or otherwise distributing products who sells or distributes a defective
product is subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused by the defect.”) (emphasis
added). 
86. See id. at cmt. a (“American courts began to recognize that a commercial seller ...
should be liable in tort for harm caused by the defect regardless of the plaintiff’s ability to
maintain a traditional negligence or warranty action. Liability attached even if the manu-
facturer’s quality control in producing the defective product was reasonable.”). 
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III. INSURMOUNTABLE PROBLEMS WITH WRONGFUL LIFE
It appears, then, that none of the proffered defenses of, nor justif-
ications for, allowing wrongful life recovery succeed in solving the
conceptual problems historically associated with the cause of ac-
tion—specifically, attributing causation to the physician’s negligent
conduct and measuring damages.87 Wrongful life does not fit
squarely within the existing doctrines of negligence, contract, or
strict liability.88 However, the law has often bent existing doctrines,
so to speak, in order to accomplish certain societal goals and make
recovery available in a desired context.89 Mere conceptual incongru-
ity on its own cannot, therefore, justify the denial of wrongful life
recovery, particularly in the face of societal goals that defenders of
wrongful life liability contend justify the cause of action. 
Many proponents of wrongful life appeal to the tort goals of cost-
spreading and deterrence of negligent or wrongful conduct by
physicians as rationales for allowing recovery, regardless of the
conceptual difficulties wrongful life entails.90 Frasca writes that
birth-related torts, or “negligent beginnings is a unique area of the
law where deterrence, rather than victim compensation, is the
driving force for damages,” based on judicial recognition that
“without damages there can be no deterrence.”91 Belsky, for exam-
ple, contends that because physicians carry medical malpractice
insurance, they can bear the costs of a child’s disability better than
the child’s family.92 Furthermore, denying recovery because of the
inability to measure injury to “philosophical certainty” gives clearly
87. See supra Part I.
88. See supra Part II.
89. For example, acting out of a desire to impose liability without fault upon manufac-
turers, courts created the doctrine of strict liability in tort for defective products by combining
elements of negligence from tort law with the concept of implied warranty from contract law.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 1 cmt. a (1998). Similarly, in wrongful death actions
stemming from car accidents and other fatal injuries, courts have extended recovery to
compensate a decedent’s estate for the defendant’s emotional distress and dread because of
his apprehension of imminent death before the fatal physical impact. Beynon v. Montgomery
Cablevision Ltd. P’ship, 718 A.2d 1161 (1998) (allowing recovery for pre-impact fright as a
matter of first impression).
90. See Pollard, supra note 45, at 337.
91. Frasca, supra note 44, at 199. 
92. See Belsky, supra note 75, at 256-57. 
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negligent physicians a windfall, and does not incentivize proper
provision of care or encourage settlement.93 
A similar argument from opponents of wrongful life contends that
imposing liability upon physicians for failure to advise of potential
birth defects would overincentivize prenatal screening.94 The pos-
sibility of a wrongful life suit would put pressure on physicians to
practice “defensive medicine” and “advise prenatal screening and
abortion” in close cases, leading to “the over-kill of normal, healthy
children.”95 However, both sides might overstate the case for deter-
rence; research has suggested that increased medical malpractice
liability has no real impact on the practice of medicine, much less
any overdeterrent effect.96
This conclusion appears to apply strongly to the field of obstetrics.
Studies have found no systematic improvement in healthcare out-
comes when obstetricians face a higher threat of malpractice liabil-
ity.97 Nor does an obstetrician’s history of being sued for malpractice
affect subsequent quality of practice.98 Most relevant to wrongful life
liability, a study of obstetricians suggested there is no correlation
between experience with or exposure to malpractice liability and
increased use of prenatal resources such as ultrasound, referrals to
specialists, and various precautionary tests.99 Physicians’ assess-
ments of the medical necessity of tests, not fear of liability, deter-
mined usage.100 Most tellingly, this study focused on obstetricians
in Washington twelve years after the state first allowed recovery for
wrongful life.101
93. See id. at 262-63.
94. James Bopp, Jr. et al., The “Rights” and “Wrongs” of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful
Life: A Jurisprudential Analysis of Birth Related Torts, 27 DUQ. L. REV. 461, 514-15 (1989).
95. See id.
96. See Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory and
Evidence for Malpractice Reform, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1595, 1606 (2002) (citing a review by the
Office of Technology Studies of the U.S. Congress).
97. See Frank A. Sloan et al., Effects of the Threat of Medical Malpractice Litigation and
Other Factors on Birth Outcomes, 33 MED. CARE 700, 710-11 (1995).
98. See Stephen S. Entman et al., The Relationship Between Malpractice Claims History
and Subsequent Obstetric Care, 272 JAMA 1588, 1590 (1994). 
99. Laura-Mae Baldwin et al., Defensive Medicine and Obstetrics, 274 JAMA 1606, 1606,
1609 (1995). 
100. See id.
101. Compare id., with Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 483 (Wash. 1983).
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Deterrence, therefore, appears an unsatisfying basis for ignoring
the conceptual difficulties inherent in wrongful life claims. Although
the desire to spread costs has some intuitive force, particularly in
light of its prominent place in contemporary tort law, it must out-
weigh significant harmful ramifications that broader recognition of
wrongful life claims will have, particularly requiring courts to make
valuations on human life and creating incongruity with Roe v. Wade. 
A. Wrongful Life Claims Require Judicial Valuation of Individual
Lives
As discussed in Part II, a majority of courts have denied recovery
for wrongful life to avoid making uncomfortable comparisons be-
tween existing in a disabled state and not existing at all, which
would seem to conflict with the notion of the intrinsic value of life.
Proponents of wrongful life have criticized this position in light of
the fact that the value of life has become increasingly relative.102
Perry contends that courts cannot objectively determine the value
of life, which remains a mystery, and that “[t]he argument that life
is always preferable to nonexistence is necessarily subjective, value
laden, and rooted in personal beliefs (moral, religious, or other). It
is not an objective argument based on a scientific examination of
reality.”103 Furthermore, the legality of abortion, euthanasia, and
the right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment suggest, not
necessarily that nonexistence is categorically superior to disability,
but that the value of life is relative.104 Thus, courts cannot justify
rejecting wrongful life claims on the basis of any alleged inherent
sanctity or value of life alone.105
Many proponents of wrongful life have pointed to “right to die” ju-
risprudence as showing the relative nature of the sanctity of life,
thereby undermining traditional justifications for denying the cause
102. See John Harris, The Wrong of Wrongful Life, 17 J.L. & SOC’Y 90, 101 (1990) (“Con-
cerning children or adults in being who can have a view about the worthwhile nature of
existence, the question can surely only be answered subjectively. A condition is worse than
non-existence if and only if the subject would rather not exist than exist in such a condition.”). 
103. Perry, supra note 61, at 369. 
104. See id. at 368.
105. See id.
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of action.106 If courts can recognize the right of a terminally ill indi-
vidual to decide to refuse life-prolonging treatment, the argument
goes, the law thus vindicates the position that nonexistence can be
preferable to existence in a disabled state.107 
In addition to supporting the relative value of life, some support-
ers of wrongful life have sought to use “right to die” jurisprudence
more substantively to establish harm.108 Pollard, for example, con-
tends that a physician who causes the birth of a child in a severely
defective state—terminally ill and in constant pain—commits a
violation of the child’s due process right of freedom that warrants
redress through the wrongful life cause of action.109 
Those who use “right to die” cases to argue for the recognition of
wrongful life ignore several key idiosyncrasies of those cases that
limit their relevance to a wrongful life context. First, in “right to die”
cases, the injury complained of is the violation of an individual
liberty interest caused by unwanted medical treatment, prolonging
a life of suffering.110 In other words, the harm in “right to die” cases
is life itself, the very conceptual scheme wrongful life seeks to avoid.
The basis of “right to die” cases is not any determination by the
court that nonexistence can be better than existence; the state may
in fact adhere to a baseline view that life is categorically valuable
but simply must recognize that individuals may conclude otherwise
on their own and reject treatment based on the liberty interest in
bodily integrity.111 
Casting life as an injury in “right to die” situations arguably
works in a way that cannot apply in wrongful life cases. When an
106. See, e.g., Pollard, supra note 45, at 359. 
107. See id.
108. See I. Giesen, Of Wrongful Birth, Wrongful Life, Comparative Law and the Politics of
Tort Law Systems, 72 TYDSKRIF VIR HEDENDAAGSE ROMEINS-HOLLANDSE REG. [THRHR] 257,
268 (2009) (S. Afr.) (arguing that wrongful life actions at heart vindicate the right to self-
determination, exercised by parents on behalf of the child). 
109. Pollard, supra note 45, at 372. 
110. See Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990)
(holding that the logic of due process cases suggests that the “forced administration of life-
sustaining medical treatment” implicates a liberty interest and the patient’s right to refuse).
111. See id. at 282 (“Finally, we think a State may properly decline to make judgments
about the ‘quality’ of life that a particular individual may enjoy, and simply assert an
unqualified interest in the preservation of human life to be weighed against the
constitutionally protected interests of the individual.”); see also id. at 281 (“The choice
between life and death is a deeply personal decision of obvious and overwhelming finality.”).
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individual receives life-sustaining medical treatment in violation of
his wish to die, a court may vindicate his liberty interest by recog-
nizing his ability to determine the value of his own life without hav-
ing to evaluate that individual determination. The court need only
cast the unwanted treatment as a battery that the individual may
validly reject. In contrast, courts addressing wrongful life have no
alternative available framework, such as battery, that would allow
them to resolve wrongful life cases without approaching the issue of
the value of human life. Rather, wrongful life requires courts to
weigh, evaluate, and vindicate an individual determination of the
value of life. The preference for judicial agnosticism with regard to
individual valuation of life in “right to die” jurisprudence thus does
not support, but rather militates against, allowing wrongful life
liability.
A notable similarity exists between “right to die” and wrongful
life suits that makes the plaintiff’s case difficult in both: each alleg-
edly hinges on a highly subjective, particularized judgment as to the
value an individual places on his existence, but in both situations,
the individual cannot express this judgment. A plaintiff seeking the
removal of life-sustaining medical treatment often cannot express
this desire because of a medical condition, and wrongful life plain-
tiffs are usually too young, too impaired, or both to articulate their
preferences. Courts in both cases have turned to the substituted
judgments of parents or family to approximate the plaintiff’s
wishes.112
However, courts have expressed doubts about the adequacy of
substituted judgment in the “right to die” context. For example, the
Cruzan court upheld a Missouri requirement for clear and convinc-
ing evidence of the patient’s desire before removal of life support.113
The court expressed concerns about whether family members’ sub-
stituted judgment always accurately captures the plaintiff’s wishes,
noting that loved ones likely have their own strong feelings about
the best result for the patient, which may differ from what the pa-
tient, if competent, would want.114 The Court ultimately concluded
that it did “not think the Due Process Clause requires the State to
112. See, e.g., id.; Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 962 (Cal. 1982).
113. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 285.
114. See id. at 286.
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repose judgment on these matters with anyone but the patient
herself.”115 
Similar difficulties can arise in wrongful life. Proponents usually
assert that an incompetent plaintiff’s parents are in the best posi-
tion to choose between life and nonlife on behalf of their child—and
to vindicate their choice in the courtroom—but admit that determin-
ing the subjective will and quality of life of a fetus or severely
defective child can be difficult.116 Belsky admits that parental deci-
sions can deviate so far from the child’s best interests as to become
“negligent or even reckless.”117 If the valuation at issue in wrongful
life suits is truly subjective and personal, like the interest asserted
in “right to die” cases, it becomes doubtful that parents, much less
courts, can ascertain the will of the child with sufficient certainty to
justify granting recovery. The fact that these cases, like Cruzan,
depend upon the involvement of family members who likely have
their own interests compounds this difficulty. 
This familial involvement takes a robust form in wrongful life
cases through the requirement that the child’s mother, by all means
a biased party, testify that but for the failure to diagnose the condi-
tion, she would have aborted.118 An objector might not view the role
that a mother’s own preferences or interests might have in wrongful
life as problematic, because a mother can have a judicially recog-
nized interest in obtaining an abortion. However, this objection
elides the important distinction between wrongful life and wrongful
birth causes of action: the parents may seek compensation for their
own lost right to abort through wrongful birth, but wrongful life
asserts the child’s interests alone.119 
On a broader level, justifying wrongful life recovery on the basis
of “right to die” jurisprudence has dangerous repercussions. Pro-
ponents of disability rights in particular have criticized wrongful
life’s relativization of the value of human life and its negative effects
on the disabled. Wendy F. Hensel, for example, accepts that cost-
115. Id. 
116. See, e.g., Pollard, supra note 45, at 360. 
117. See Belsky, supra note 75, at 229-30.
118. See, e.g., Pollard, supra note 45, at 361.
119. See supra notes 43-44. Practically speaking, the fact that parents often bring a
wrongful life claim on behalf of their child in conjunction with their own wrongful birth claim
obscures the conceptual difference between the two. 
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spreading is a compelling justification for wrongful life at the level
of the individual plaintiff, but argues that negative societal reper-
cussions outweigh any efficiency benefits, for wrongful life grants
relief only to those disabled plaintiffs “willing to openly disavow
their self-worth and dignity.”120 This in turn entrenches a negative
view of disability in society, because wrongful life “is akin to a state-
sanctioned acknowledgement that the community of one’s peers may
legitimately evaluate whether an individual with impairments has
a rightful place in the community and whether his functional lim-
itations are sufficiently disruptive to warrant the preference of
nonexistence.”121 For Hensel, the fact that in wrongful life cases the
emphasis lies not on the negligent conduct of the physician but on
the plaintiff’s disability—tacitly sending negative messages about
disability—is more problematic than any conceptual difficulties with
wrongful life.122
Darpana M. Sheth goes so far as to argue that state laws allowing
wrongful birth and wrongful life suits violate the Americans with
Disabilities Act’s prohibition on discrimination against individuals
with disabilities by public entities.123 She contends that increased
training and continuing education in genetic testing, disciplinary
action by state medical licensing boards against negligent genetic
counselors, and federal regulation of labs that do genetic testing
120. Wendy F. Hensel, The Disabling Impact of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Actions,
40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 141, 171 (2005). 
121. See id. at 174. For Hensel, the fact that most jurors will make this inquiry from a non-
disabled perspective causes particular concern. See id. at 185. 
122. See id. at 144. In an empirical study, Professors Dov Fox and Christopher Griffin
found plausible support for the contention that societal perceptions of disability affect poten-
tial parents’ reproductive decisions. Dov Fox & Christopher L. Griffin, Jr., Disability-Selective
Abortion and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 845, 892. Their econ-
ometric analysis showed that birthrates of children with Down syndrome decreased
significantly and steadily from 1993 to 1998. Id. at 893. Fox and Griffin found that legal,
economic, medical, and technological factors could not adequately explain this large change,
and hypothesize that the Americans with Disabilities Act, “through its influence on social in-
teraction and media coverage, reinforced negative affective attitudes toward people with
disabilities in general and toward those with Down syndrome in particular,” leading to an
increase in abortions after Down syndrome diagnoses. Id. at 892.
123. See Darpana M. Sheth, Better Off Unborn? An Analysis of Wrongful Birth and
Wrongful Life Claims Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 73 TENN. L. REV. 641, 661-62
(2006). 
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would all prevent negligence without the unpalatable and illegal
consequences of allowing wrongful life suits.124 
Even beyond its harmful effects on disability, wrongful life cre-
ates dangers in that it forces courts into the business of making
value judgments about human life, the exact result “right to die”
jurisprudence seeks to avoid. In his dissent in Cruzan, Justice
Brennan expressed skepticism about the legitimacy of a state
interest in life independent from the value that the individual plac-
es on it, arguing that “the State has no legitimate general interest
in someone’s life, completely abstracted from the interest of the
person living that life, that could outweigh the person’s choice to
avoid medical treatment.”125 Mark Strasser presents a similar ob-
jection: What if a wrongful life suit does not necessarily make any
statement about the value the plaintiff places on life simpliciter, but
simply asserts that she would prefer never having lived at all to
living in her afflicted state?126 
Rather than resolve difficulties with wrongful life, though, these
objections underscore them: even if true that the wrongful life plain-
tiff makes a judgment about his own life, the court must evaluate it.
Regardless of how courts measure recovery—whether in tort or con-
tract, whether granting specific or general damages—courts cannot
avoid value judgments about life: which plaintiffs are in such a
terrible state that they justifiably conclude they would prefer never
to have lived at all, and which are in states that are not so severe as
to warrant recovery. Courts would thus have to make judgments, or
at least evaluate individual judgments, as to the value of life. Other-
wise, anyone with the most modest defect or difficulty could sue. 
To a certain extent, however, courts often make judgments about
the value of human life. This occurs, for example, in cases involving
life insurance policies, or in wrongful death suits in which courts
calculate damages equivalent to the value of the life lost.127
124. See id. at 665. 
125. Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 313 (1990) (Brennan,
J., dissenting). 
126. See Mark Strasser, Wrongful Life, Wrongful Birth, Wrongful Death, and the Right to
Refuse Treatment: Can Reasonable Jurisdictions Recognize All but One?, 64 MO. L. REV. 29,
63-64 (1999).
127. See Katherine J. Santon, The Worth of a Human Life, 85 N.D. L. REV. 123, 128 n.17
(2009) (contrasting a $300,000 wrongful death damage award with an $8000 damage award).
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However, these judicial valuations differ sharply from what wrong-
ful life would require. In the context of measuring damages for
wrongful death, courts do, in fact, attach higher monetary value to
some lives than others, but for objective reasons.128 Regardless of the
specific dollar amount awarded, courts proceed on the assumption
that the life of any given decedent was an affirmative good, the loss
of which requires compensation. Wrongful life, by contrast, requires
courts to cordon off a subset of individual lives that are not valuable
goods whose loss requires restitution, but compensable harms in
themselves. Wrongful life does not depend upon wrongful death’s
upward sliding scale of appreciating value of lives, but rather a
downward sliding scale of depreciating value. Courts evaluating
wrongful life suits would then have to determine the point on the
scale below which life itself becomes an injury.
Contrary to the arguments of some wrongful life proponents,129
courts cannot say that the value of life is relative or find the low
point on the scale past which life has no positive value. Courts can
value life only as a state interest and remain agnostic about any
individual opinions that deviate from this norm. Supreme Court de-
cisions have vindicated a state interest in preserving life, particu-
larly in the prenatal context. In Roe v. Wade, the Court held that
“the State does have an important and legitimate interest in pre-
serving and protecting ... the potentiality of human life.”130 Almost
two decades later, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylva-
nia v. Casey reaffirmed this interest.131
Proponents of wrongful life might argue that these concerns are
unnecessary, because any judicial valuation of life remains linked
to and motivated by the plaintiff ’s valuation. Pollard, for example,
contends that a civil jury is the perfect “social barometer” for
making value judgments in wrongful life cases.132 Accepting this
128. See id.
129. See Pollard, supra note 45, at 359 (arguing the right to choose nonlife ought to be
conferred on all who suffer).
130. 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973).
131. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (“[T]he State has
legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting ... the life of the fetus that
may become a child.”).
132. See Pollard, supra note 45, at 370. She contends that “[a]nswering philosophical
questions about life and death, the propriety of imposing liability in the wrongful life context,
and the appropriate measure of damages are quintessential jury issues,” and that juries are
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argument makes a step in a dangerous direction. If courts become
accustomed to making determinations about which lives are worth
living, the risk grows that courts, the government in general, and
the public at large—through the jury system—will make such
valuations on their own.
B. Roe v. Wade Forecloses Vindications of Rights Through
Wrongful Life Claims
In addition to appealing to the right to self-determination vin-
dicated in the “right-to-die” context, proponents of wrongful life have
pointed to theories of individual rights more broadly to justify
recovery.133 This focus parallels the arguments in foreign courts that
seek to justify wrongful life causes of action by appeals to human
rights laws.134 
Writing from a philosophical perspective, law professor Aaron-
Andrew P. Bruhl argues that “the person-affecting language of
rights is an attractive and appropriate vehicle for understanding our
relations with future individuals,” including in the context of wrong-
ful life.135 Bruhl discusses a major obstacle for any coherent theory
of the moral duties owed to future generations: the Non-Identity
Problem.136 First articulated by philosopher Derek Parfit, the Non-
Identity Problem occurs because of mechanics of conception: moving
the instant of potential individual X’s conception even slightly
means that the specific combination of genetic material comprising
X would not occur, and the conception of potential individual Y
might occur instead.137 Accordingly, of two mutually exclusive moral
best suited to differentiate between which claims deserve recovery and which do not. See id. 
133. For example, the plaintiff in Turpin demanded general damages for being “deprived
of the fundamental right of a child to be born as a whole, functional human being without
total deafness.” Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 956 (Cal. 1982). The court, however, refused
to grant general damages on the basis of their incalculability. Id. at 964. 
134. See supra note 6. “Ms. H,” the plaintiff in the South African case, contended that the
focus on children’s rights in the South African Constitution and Children’s Act supports the
recognition of a wrongful life cause of action in the common law of South Africa. See Sapa,
supra note 6.
135. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Note, Justice Unconceived: How Posterity Has Rights, 14
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 393, 397 (2002). 
136. See id. at 409. 
137. See DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 377-78 (1984).
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choices bearing upon future individuals, one might make the future
world worse than the other would, but in doing so it makes the
world worse for no one: Choice A might cause X to come to exist in
a world worse than the world Choice B would bring about, but in
Choice B’s world, Y, not X, would exist.138 It seems, therefore, that
choosing Choice A cannot be morally wrong: although X will come
to exist in a world worse than could have been otherwise, in any
different world X would not exist at all.139 The Non-Identity Problem
tracks the bewilderment courts have faced when asked to award
recovery for wrongful life. Even assuming arguendo that the
physician behaved negligently, his conduct does not clearly cause a
moral harm to the plaintiff sufficient to justify imposing liability.
Had the plaintiff not come to exist in the disabled state, she would
not exist at all, and thus she is not worse off as a result of the
physician’s conduct.
Bruhl contends that using rights theory to describe relations be-
tween present and future generations circumvents the Non-Identity
Problem.140 He insists that “[t]he mere fact that a person does not
now exist does not mean that what we now do cannot violate his or
her rights.”141 He uses the example of a manufacturer that produced
a defective automobile five years ago, which results in harm to a
four-year-old child today.142 Although the child did not yet exist at
the time of the car’s manufacture, the negligent design causes a
moral harm to the child in the same way it would an adult.143
Similarly, a criminal who plants a bomb that goes off after thirty
years, harming a fifty-year-old woman and twenty-five-year-old man
violates both victims’ rights to bodily autonomy in the same way,
despite the fact that the man did not exist at the time the criminal
planted the bomb.144
138. See id.
139. See id. 
140. Bruhl, supra note 135, at 416-17. Bruhl defines rights as an individual’s entitlement
that require others to behave in a certain way with respect to the individual. See id. at 405.
Parfit, though, explicitly rejects the conclusion that rights can solve the Non-Identity Problem.
PARFIT, supra note 137, at 366.
141. Bruhl, supra note 135, at 415 (emphasis omitted).
142. See id. at 414.
143. See id.
144. See id. at 415. 
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Bruhl accepts the intuitive force of the idea that one who causes
another’s impaired existence benefits that other person notwith-
standing the impairment, but he argues that this argument misses
the point of rights-based moral theory: “A right protects one or more
of a person’s interests or protects an aspect of its owner’s well-being,
not his overall index of welfare.”145 Limiting rights to protecting
aspects of well-being, instead of protecting well-being in general,
tracks the reasoning of the courts that have allowed the wrongful
life cause of action and awarded damages that compensate only the
aspect of the child’s existence damaged by disability, not the child’s
existence as a whole.146
Although at first blush rights-based theories, like Bruhl’s, for
defining relations to future individuals map neatly onto wrongful
life and might help courts more clearly define injury, they fail to
adequately describe wrongful life cases for several reasons. First,
defining rights as protecting an aspect of well-being as Bruhl does
makes determining causation impossible. If each individual right
protects an individual “aspect” of well-being, a putatively negligent
doctor’s conduct would infringe upon an “aspect” of the plaintiff ’s
being—characterized as freedom from pain or defect; in other words,
the physician violates the child’s “right” to live an unimpaired life. 
However, an account of the right, and therefore the compensable
harm, limited in this way to a single aspect of the plaintiff, separate
from his existence as a whole, requires an equally limited account
of the cause of the right’s violation separate from the cause of the
plaintiff ’s existence.147 A physician does not cause the violation of
the “right” to freedom from suffering, but only causes the child’s
existence. Any attempt to define the harm in terms of a violation of
a right therefore fails to connect the defendant’s conduct to the
harm. Negligence or strict liability understandings of wrongful life,
which both require proof of this connection,148 therefore fail on a
rights-based view. 
145. Id. at 418. 
146. See supra notes 23-37 and accompanying text.
147. This idea mirrors the required connection between causation and harm in traditional
negligence doctrine. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text. 
148. See supra Part II.A.
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Second, a rights-based approach to wrongful life creates the same
problems as a contract-based approach. Bruhl conceives of rights as
relational, with each right creating a corresponding duty in other
individuals.149 If, then, there exists some right in an infant plaintiff,
which a negligent physician violates, there exists some correspond-
ing duty in the physician. Casting the right as the right to live free
of bodily harm, or free of disability, and holding physicians liable for
violations of this right, would require defining the physician’s duty
as a duty not to cause a child to exist in such a state. This cannot be
the duty of the physician, because no doctor can guarantee a perfect-
ly healthy child.150 Imposing such a duty would hold a physician
liable for a disabled child even absent any negligence; as discussed
above, such a strict liability approach fails.151 
And even if the doctor gave the parents all the necessary infor-
mation and complied perfectly with the standard of a reasonable
physician, the parents can still choose not to have an abortion and
instead bring into existence a child with the alleged right violated.
In such a situation, the physician’s conduct was in no way wrongful,
but the child still came to exist in the harmed state. Defining this
state as a compensable injury would require, in the case of a non-
negligent physician, an imposition of a duty on the parents—effect-
ively a duty to abort. 
Bruhl is correct that the Non-Identity Problem is not a problem
in the wrongful life context,152 but for reasons that make rights-
based arguments impossible. This is because a child that has been
conceived has a greater degree of metaphysical specificity than a
not-yet-born person that only exists as a mental concept, and not
even as a determinate individual. The key premise of the Non-
Identity Problem, that any future individual can potentially not
exist if conception is delayed even slightly,153 does not apply to
wrongful life cases, in which conception has occurred and an in-
dividual, or at least a potential individual as a determinate entity,
exists. 
149. Bruhl, supra note 135, at 405-06, 420. 
150. See supra Part II.A.
151. See supra Part II.C. 
152. See Bruhl, supra note 135, at 410-11.
153. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
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Bruhl’s examples, then, are distinguishable from the alleged in-
jury in wrongful life. In the cases of the defective automobile and
the planted bomb, the malefactor infringes upon the right of a
future, not-yet-determined individual, by altering the world such
that it will cause harm to the future individual once the individual
becomes determinate. In the case of wrongful life, the physician
causes the already conceived, determinate child to come to exist in
a disabled state, but could not cause it to exist otherwise. The
perception of greater “entitativeness” in the potential child makes
the Non-Identity Problem even more uncomfortable; courts cannot
say the child, once born, has been harmed because the alternative
is nonexistence, yet this seems unsatisfactory in light of the sense
that the negligent physician’s conduct harms a determinate entity. 
In dismissing inquiries into measuring the difference between
existence and nonexistence as metaphysical inquiries beyond ju-
dicial capability, while still permitting recovery for medical and
other damages, courts do not avoid doing metaphysics; they do bad
metaphysics and dress it up as law. Courts cannot separate a child’s
impaired existence from the child’s existence as a whole, compensat-
ing one without the other, because rights only “vest” upon birth to
the extent that, or in the manner in which, the child exists.154 None
of the proffered defenses of wrongful life escapes the conclusion that,
to permit recovery, a court must cast the plaintiff ’s very existence
as an injury. Existence, however, can never be an injury, for injury
requires infringing of a right, and rights cannot rationally be predi-
cated of that which does not exist.155
This explains the difference between wrongful life and Bruhl’s
examples. The car manufacturer and bomb planter’s conduct vio-
lates the rights of their victims by causing them to exist in such-a-
world; at the time of the harm, the victims are fully determinate
individuals with compensable rights to exist in a world other than
the one the tortfeasors caused. The physician in a wrongful life case,
by contrast, causes the child to exist, not in such-a-world, but as
154. See Bruhl, supra note 135, at 427-28.
155. Bruhl, too, links rights to existence—the duty not to violate a future person’s right can
exist before the right vests, so to speak, at the person’s birth. See id. at 407. He states,
“neither rights nor duties have any sort of existential priority over the other.” Id. Thus, rights
only become meaningful when predicated of a person. See id.
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such-a-thing, and the physician could not have caused the child to
exist as anything else. The only alternative was to cause the child
not to exist at all. To classify this as a compensable violation of a
right as Bruhl suggests would require the plaintiff to have the right
to exist in a state other than that in which he does—a nondisabled
state. 
To assert that a child plaintiff has a compensable “right” to exist
in a manner other than that in which they do, when medically
speaking the child could not have been born otherwise, would grant
a right to exist as a healthy human person even before one is born.
But this sort of predication of fetal rights is exactly what Roe v.
Wade rejected.156 The Roe Court resisted predicating any metaphysi-
cally robust notion of personhood of a fetus: “We need not resolve
the difficult question of when life begins. When those trained in ...
medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any con-
sensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of man’s
knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer.”157 
The Court rejected the contention that a fetus has rights that
limit its mother’s right to privacy: “[W]e do not agree that, by
adopting one theory of life [that a fetus’s life and rights begin at
conception], Texas may override the rights of the pregnant woman
that are at stake.”158 And although the Court recognized limits to
the mother’s right to obtain an abortion, the limiting principle was
not any right or interest of the fetus, but rather the state’s interest
in preserving potential life.159 Rather than adopt any robust theory
of life, the Court made fetal viability the dividing line.160 
Although a child’s life is protected after viability,161 it can be as-
sumed by definition that in wrongful life contexts abortion would be
feasible. Thus, the fetuses’ putative right to exist as healthy human
beings during the stage where abortion is permissible contradicts
Roe. If wrongful life rests on the assumption that a right to abortion
156. See 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 162.
159. See id. at 162-63.
160. Id. at 163 (“With respect to the State’s important and legitimate interest in potential
life, the ‘compelling’ point is at viability. This is so because the fetus then presumably has the
capability of meaningful life outside the mother’s womb.”).
161. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869-70 (1992).
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exists, and, as Perry concedes, “abortion rights rest on the assump-
tion that a fetus is not a living person,”162 then any argument for
wrongful life that predicates rights of fetuses to exist as healthy
persons must fail. Presuming the feasibility of exercising the right
to abortion in the wrongful life context warrants once again high-
lighting the difference between parents’ actions for wrongful birth
and the child’s action for wrongful life. The rights-based arguments
for wrongful life assert self-contradictory rights of the child, and do
not invoke any right of the parents under Roe and Casey to obtain
a previability abortion. Rather, the separate cause of action for
wrongful birth, which goes beyond the scope of this Note, exists to
vindicate any separate rights of the parents. 
In sum, any cause of action alleging that an abortion should have
occurred depends upon a conception of the human person and its
rights that fundamentally conflicts with the right to abortion as
outlined in Roe. But how could such a peculiar outcome arise in
cases that seem to be the natural corollary to Roe? The Curlender
court noted: “We deem this decision [Roe] to be of considerable im-
portance in defining the parameters of ‘wrongful-life’ litigation.”163
A possible answer lies in Roe’s analysis, which separated an
ontologically robust notion of rights from any grounding in an
ontologically robust notion of personhood, forgetting that rights are
fundamentally properties predicated on specifically existent individ-
uals.164 The Court unpacked the concept of “personal rights that can
162. Perry, supra note 61, at 369. As Pollard’s analysis shows, a coherent theory of
wrongful life has no choice but to reject the very assumption upon which it depends: “Since
the fetus will be the person who will suffer from the harms that foreseeably ensue from the
undisclosed birth defects, the fetus is clearly in the class of persons foreseeably harmed.” 
Pollard, supra note 45, at 344 (emphasis added). 
163. Curlender ex rel. Curlender v. Bio-Sci. Labs., 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 483 (Cal. Ct. App.
1980), abrogated by Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954 (1982).
164. See supra note 154. Although the scope of this Note does not permit a deeper
discussion of this idea, as an initial suggestion, Robert Sokolowski’s phenomenological vocab-
ulary is instructive on this point. He divides the aspects of objects of intelligible speech into
accidentals and essentials: accidentals are those predications that may just happen to be true
of a thing, but need not be for the thing to be itself; essentials are predications true of a thing
because of what it is. See ROBERT SOKOLOWSKI, PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE HUMAN PERSON 101,
106 (2008). He divides essentials further into properties, which flow necessarily from a thing,
and essence, which underlies properties and describes what the thing actually is. See id.
Using this terminology, a right is a property that flows from the essence of a person, one of
the properties through which the idea of a “person” makes itself intelligible to a human speak-
er. This understanding explains Bruhl’s intuitive linking of rights (properties) to existent
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be deemed ‘fundamental’” to the point of precluding any robust
notion of personhood, the very concept from which those personal
rights allegedly arise.165 Absent such a link to persons, rights stop
being properties and start becoming fictions, thus losing their
power.166 Wrongful life, as an extension of Roe, goes too far in at-
tempting to separate compensable rights from the existence of the
individuals who have them. 
At the heart then, rights-based arguments in favor of wrongful
life depend upon a compensable right to exist in a manner other
than that in which the plaintiff does, or depend upon a right to have
been aborted. Such a right cannot vest at birth, or it would be logic-
ally incoherent. And it cannot exist before birth, because this would
require granting rights of a person to an abortable fetus. Therefore,
this right does not exist, and the rights-based arguments fail in the
face of Roe v. Wade.
IV. FAVORING COMPASSION OVER COURTS
Given the impossibility of fitting wrongful life neatly within any
existing area of substantive law, and the negative repercussions
that would result, what explains the persistence of commentary in
favor of broader recognition of wrongful life? It seems that a well-in-
tentioned compassion for the plight of the disabled plaintiff, more
than any legal argument, motivates judicial recognition of wrongful
life and arguments in favor thereof.167 These motivations are noble,
but in Harris’s words, “the problem of disability should be seen as
one of social justice,” not an issue for the courts.168
individuals (essences). See supra note 145 and accompanying text. We experience and speak
of rights as properties, as predicated of something; without this link, rights are unintelligible. 
165. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152.
166. Using Sokolowski’s vocabulary, our shared experience of the phenomenon of “rights”
loses its intelligibility when we lose sight of its status as a property. See SOKOLOWSKI, supra
note 164, at 107 (“Properties and essence come together. We would not know that certain
phenomena are properties unless we also had an inkling of the essence of the thing and had
begun to take the thing as one, as an instance of a kind.”). Alasdair MacIntyre specifically
denies that natural or human rights are properties, or “universal features of the human
condition,” and therefore concludes that natural rights in fact have lost their intelligibility,
and have become fictions. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL
THEORY 66-70 (2d. ed. 1984). 
167. See supra notes 18, 29.
168. Harris, supra note 102, at 104. 
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States can address the genuine needs of disabled children without
encountering the philosophical and legal difficulties that arise with
attempted judicial solutions by seeking alternative methods of com-
pensation that do not depend on the courts. Virginia and Florida
have already created programs that compensate birth-related in-
juries without resorting to litigation: the Virginia Birth-Related
Neurological Injury Compensation Program and the Florida Birth-
Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association (NICA).169
These programs operate on a no-fault model that dispenses with the
need to find negligence, causation, and damages, and focuses in-
stead on a disabled child’s medical needs through administrative
claims.170 Although these two programs are “unique experiments in
American personal injury law,” and other states have not followed
suit, they provide a model that states could potentially adopt to
meet the needs of wrongful life plaintiffs.171
The Virginia program provides lifelong expenses and care to
children born with injuries sustained due to oxygen deprivation or
other injury during labor and delivery.172 The program imposes no
burden on taxpayers, because funding comes from private sources,
including fees from hospitals and physicians who participate in the
program and assessments of nonparticipating physicians and mal-
practice insurance providers within Virginia.173 
A 2003 study by the Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commis-
sion of the Virginia General Assembly found that the program not
only served more children than Virginia’s capped medical malprac-
tice tort system, but typically provided benefits in excess of those
available from the courts.174 Additionally, the report found that the
169. See Gil Siegal et al., Adjudicating Severe Birth Injury Claims in Florida and Virginia:
The Experience of a Landmark Experiment in Personal Injury Compensation, 34 AM. J.L. &
MED. 493, 497-99 (2008).
170. See id.
171. See id. at 533. Siegal observes that the failure of these models “to inspire replications
in other states, despite widespread dissatisfaction with the current medical malpractice
system, is somewhat surprising,” and “likely reflects a mix of political, legal, and sociological
factors” that create institutional inertia in favor of the malpractice system. Id. at 534.
172. See Frequently Asked Questions, VA. BIRTH-RELATED NEUROLOGICAL INJURY COMPEN-
SATION PROGRAM, http://www.vabirthinjury.com/frequently-asked-questions/ [https://perma.
cc/2A2W-6L85] (last visited Apr. 15, 2016). 
173. See id. 
174. JOINT LEGISLATIVE AUDIT AND REVIEW COMM’N OF THE VA. GEN. ASSEMBLY, REVIEW
OF THE VIRGINIA BIRTH-RELATED NEUROLOGICAL INJURY COMPENSATION PROGRAM 25 (2003)
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program had a positive impact on medical malpractice insurance
rates throughout the state.175 Although the program does not cur-
rently cover injury or death resulting from genetic or congenital
birth defects,176 the general model could easily extend to cover in-
juries resulting from negligent genetic counseling.
The Florida legislature created the NICA program in 1988 as a
response to excessively high malpractice insurance costs resulting
from the tort system.177 Based on the not-yet-enacted Virginia pro-
gram, NICA “was designed to carve out the most severe of the birth-
related neurologically injured patients, in part so that malpractice
insurance companies would not be so fearful of doing business in a
litigious Florida environment.”178 
NICA’s eligibility criteria require that the child be born alive after
sustaining an injury to the spinal cord or brain caused by oxygen
deprivation or mechanical injury during labor, delivery, or resuscita-
tion immediately after delivery, and that the injury cause perma-
nent and substantial mental and physical impairment.179 An
administrative law judge determines whether an applicant meets
the eligibility criteria; if so, the child can receive coverage for
medical and hospital expenses, rehabilitation, therapy, custodial
care, and drugs.180 Similar to the Virginia program, NICA’s funding
does not come through tax revenues, but from assessments on
participating physicians and hospitals.181
Admittedly, these programs do have their own problems. The Vir-
ginia program, for example, has suffered from financial strains.182
http://www.vabirthinjury.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/rpt2841.pdf [https://perma.cc/
6BHU-C8ZH].
175. See id. at 32. 
176. See id. at 5.
177. See Sandy Martin, NICA—Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation
Act: Four Reasons Why This Malpractice Reform Must Be Eliminated, 26 NOVA L. REV. 609,
643-44 (2002); NICA-Florida’s Innovative Alternative to Costly Litigation, FLA. BIRTH-RELATED
NEUROLOGICAL INJ. COMPENSATION ASS’N [NICA], www.nica.com/what-is-nica.html [https://
perma.cc/PH3V-PHFF] (last visited Apr. 15, 2016).
178. Martin, supra note 177, at 643. 
179. See Eligibility & Benefits, NICA, www.nica.com/eligibility_benefits.html [https://
perma.cc/U9SP-P5LW] (last visited Apr. 15, 2016).
180. See id. 
181. See Randall R. Bovbjerg & Frank A. Sloan, No-Fault for Medical Injury: Theory and
Evidence, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 53, 93-94 (1998).
182. See Siegal et al., supra note 169, at 534. 
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Dr. Sandy Martin criticizes NICA for failing to achieve its goal of
lowering malpractice litigation rates and points to four main defects
in the program: (1) physicians dislike the funding system because
it does not allow them to see the benefits of their payments to the
program, (2) the program’s notice requirement is unwieldy for both
claimants and practitioners, (3) the program has prompted an ongo-
ing jurisdictional struggle between the judiciary and the legislature,
and (4) the eligibility definition is so narrow that claimants often
end up in the tort system anyway.183 However, these criticisms
relate more to NICA’s stated goal of alleviating burdens on practitio-
ners by removing plaintiffs with cognizable claims from the courts,
and could easily be resolved in a system focused on compensating
children who have no cognizable legal recourse. 
Regardless of the idiosyncratic difficulties that the Virginia and
Florida systems have encountered, the general model is fit for adap-
tation to the wrongful life context; both the Virginia and Florida
programs determine the appropriate level of compensation based on
the child’s medical needs, not any evaluation of a physician’s negli-
gence or causation.184 As Siegal notes, “[f]rom a technical stand-
point, both programs have demonstrated successful operationaliza-
tion of compensation criteria that do not involve negligence, and
there is much to admire about how they have accomplished this.”185
He points out that external factors, such as the conditions that lead
to the programs’ establishment, the quality of the medical knowl-
edge that underlies compensation criteria, and the programs’
relationship to the tort system, have as much or more to do with the
programs’ success as does their design.186 Thus, firmly divorcing
wrongful life from the tort system once and for all will make no-fault
programs more likely to succeed, and actually achieve the aims of
wrongful life causes of action.
183. See Martin, supra note 177, at 624-25. 
184. See Siegal et al., supra note 169, at 497-99.
185. Id. at 534.
186. See id. 
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CONCLUSION
It seems that in the end, the majority of courts have adopted the
correct rule in refusing to recognize wrongful life claims.187 Proposed
justifications from negligence, contract, and strict liability fail to
circumvent the problem of having to define the child’s very existence
as an injury. Furthermore, even discarding concerns about a perfect
fit with existing doctrines, any recognition of wrongful life claims
requires impermissible judicial valuation of human life, and an un-
wieldy notion of individual rights that undermines wrongful life’s
foundation in Roe v. Wade. Those seeking a solution to the problem
of disability resulting from improper genetic counseling must
therefore leave the courts and look elsewhere.
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